In 2007, the old apartment block at 12 Workers’ Street in the village of Vylgort in the Syktyvdinsky District of the Komi Republic in the northwest of Russia was condemned as unfit for human habitation.

And about time. Elena Odnovarchenko, who rented an apartment in the block, described the conditions under which she lived with her husband and two daughters. The walls were warped with damp, covered with fungus, and separated from the floor by about a meter. The only heating came from the stove, which was unable to keep the apartment warm in the winter. A stench rose from the shit that had accumulated in the basement. The building was leaning over so far that its collapse was a real danger.

Fearing for their lives as well as their health, Elena’s family moved to temporary accommodation in another part of the country, leaving most of their belongings behind. This was the first in a series of temporary places of residence. [Read more].

"The Kremlin’s current strategy may not be identical to that of its Soviet predecessors, but it does seem somewhat similar. The current neo-Soviet authorities, like their Soviet predecessors of the late 1980s, are under threat to lose their power and unsure how to confront the growing democratic movement. Knowingly or not, the ultranationalists in Russia’s civic movement might play a useful role for theancien régime. Their presence at the protests could both divide the democratic movement and provide a pretext for a clampdown by the authorities. Moreover, the participation of former neo-fascists at demonstrations has proven damaging to the protests’ reputation of the protests abroad. The Russian democrats would thus be well advised to limit the leadership of future mass meetings, as well as the ranks of those who speak, to individuals of clear democratic orientation."

Instead of trading political freedom for effective governance, the “national leader” took away Russians’ civil and political rights without, however, delivering what he had promised, in exchange. 

'Arguably, Putin made – within the logic of his own system that could have survived longer – one major strategic and one crucial tactical mistake. Strategically, Putin’s preeminent failure was that his “vertical of power” did not fulfill one of its major purposes: to end or, at least, limit corruption in post-Soviet Russia. Instead, of producing a modernizing authoritarianism along the lines of post-war South Korea, Taiwan or Singapore, Putin’s rule deepened rather than erased certain pathologies of late Soviet and early post-Soviet society. Above all, it did not reduce the massive bribe-taking/-giving that goes on in all spheres of Russian public life. Corruption seems to have become even a problem for the security organs that grew out of the KGB – from where Putin once came.

This failure has discredited the rationale of Putin’s contract with society: Instead of trading political freedom for effective governance, the “national leader” took away Russians’ civil and political rights without, however, delivering what he had promised, in exchange. Neither did he end the collusion between the state and the so-called “oligarchs,” nor did he fight bureaucratic arbitrariness effectively. It is no accident that one of the leaders of the current protest movement, the nationalist Alexei Navalnyi, made himself initially a name by blogging about prominent corruption cases in Russia’s elite.'- from Andreas Umland, 'The Sources and Risks of Russia’s White Revolution: Why Putin failed and the Russian democrats may too', Foreign Policy Journal, 2 January 2012

"If I was a citizen of the RF I would definitely vote on Sunday, despite knowing that the 'election' would be far from free and fair. More importantly, I would already have been observing the pre-'election' process and informing the excellent 'Golos' organisation of any violations of the rules and regulations that I had noticed. The run-up to polling day is in some ways more important than what happens on the day itself. ('Golos' seems to have got the Russian neo-Soviet political Establishment really rattled. Its name is etymologically connected to 'glasnost'', not entirely adequately translated as 'transparency'. The present Moscow White House and Kremlin seem to be less tolerant of 'glasnost'' than the Gorbachev faction of the CPSU was in the late 1980s.) What to me is really important is the overall trend or tendency. Are the 2011 'elections' more free and fair or less free and fair than the corresponding 'elections' in 2007, 2003 and 1999? I would be trying to answer that question in my area and discussing it with friends and colleagues elsewhere in the RF.

Why would I vote (as well as observe) on Sunday, being sure that the results would be manipulated at a higher level, if not at any 'observable' levels? Because I think that for all their faults 'elections' even under the wretched Putin regime are at least somewhat more like real elections than 'elections' were in Soviet Russia from 1918 until the late 1980s. I have been an official observer (for the OSCE/ODIHR) of a dozen elections and 'elections' in the former USSR, and on many occasions I have been really moved by how seriously (often in contrast to the situation in my country, where elections are taken for granted by most people, and a huge proportion of the electorate doesn't bother to vote) the opportunity is taken to express one's preference, if one so desires, for a party other than the one in power. At least afterwards such people can tell their friends and family that they at least tried to improve the political situation in their country, however minimal the chances of success. And on this occasion, the more votes there are for parties other than United Russia just might increase the chances of forcing the regime to tolerate the development of a stronger, more active and more tolerant independent society.

Personally, I always prefer to be proactive and positive rather than purely negative, and so I vote for a person or a party rather than against certain people and certain parties. So, if I could, I would vote for Yabloko, if only as the least bad choice." 

Source: Boell Foundation, Russia Blog by Jens_Siegert

25 September 2011

Putin’s return to the heart of the empire hasn’t come as a surprise. Admittedly, my bet had been on Medvedev right to the last moment, but it’s always been a bet I had to convince myself about, one with lots of ifs and buts, reservations and uncertainties. Besides, I broadly agree with those who have lately pointed out that it didn’t really make much difference whether it was Putin or Medvedev sitting in the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the way my Russian friends have responded to this news, which has reached me in Berlin, as well as my own stomach, suggests that this may have been a rational fallacy. Certainly, the difference, if any, is one of style rather than content. But in personalized, de-institutionalized regimes such as the one in present-day Russia, it is often style that makes the difference. The queasiness I (we) have felt in the stomach since this morning has been intense enough to make several of us calculate with great unease how old we will be twelve years from now. For we are now facing another 12 years of Putin.

It is, of course, possible that it won’t last that long. Putin personifies the stagnation of past years. As for Medvedev, it is generally assumed that he was too weak rather than unwilling to take real steps towards modernisation.

But before I begin to come to grips with all this I would like to quote a few paragraphs from a commentary by Mikhail Fishman from the daily Vedomosti of last Friday, i.e. the day of Putin’s fresh enthronement. In it, Fishman tries to capture the two-facedness of Medvedev’s presidency. It goes well with the queasy feeling mentioned above:

“We are now witnessing the end of an era, one that is difficult to evaluate very positively. Modernisation proved to be nothing more than a noise that covered up the hands-on control of institutions and contempt for the public interest. The only thing uniting society, helpless and angry, is the conviction that the police are its enemy and all state officials, down to the very last one, are thieves.

You can tell an era by its heroes. There’s the captain who refused to delay his flight at the command of a regional governor. The policeman who complained about his superiors on YouTube. The blogger who declared a war on state corruption. The doctor who looks after homeless people at railway stations. The journalist, who, by a miracle, managed to wrest her businessman husband from prison guards after years of struggle.

The list could be extended, but it is not too long. These people have either stood up against the regime or have acted in parallel to it as if it didn’t exist. They have all done so as individuals but they all demonstrate that support, solidarity and even success can sometimes break through the smooth tarmac of mistrust and aggression.

Dmitri Medvedev has failed to meet the expectations of these people, and of the whole active part of society. He has handed out advances and now reaps anger and derision. He hasn’t even begun to complete a single one of the tasks he had set himself. Everyone can see that instead of a reformer he was just a dummy President. But is it really true that the past four years brought nothing but profanation? Many succumb to the temptation to answer this question in the affirmative.

However, I see a more ambiguous picture. It is true that Medvedev has not succeeded in office. He hasn’t taken any serious decisions; he hasn’t changed the course of history. Nevertheless, against this background there do stand out his qualities as a private person elevated to the top of an enormous bureaucratic machine by the will of fate. These qualities include his lack of vindictiveness and aggression. This Russian President has responded to life like a man with an open world view.

There are many examples of this: Svetlana Bakhmina, imprisoned as part of the YUKOS case, who couldn’t have been released without intervention from the very top. […] And another example: Medvedev has openly defended Yegor Bychkov, an activist of the City without Drugs Foundation, convicted for using illegal drug therapy methods. On the other hand an entire political party has been disbanded just to prevent the head of the Foundation, Yevgeni Roysman, from standing in the forthcoming elections to the Duma; Roysman himself has been depicted as a gangster.

It is quite clear why: the first case involves assisting a specific individual, in the latter case the system felt threatened. As a bureaucrat Medvedev has protected the ‘vertical’ interests of the power that he did not create himself. He has also resisted the ‘vertical’ but only as a private person, so to speak. In the eyes of the people the overall victory goes to the bureaucrat at the expense of the ordinary citizen. That’s how things work in Russia: officialdom is always stronger.” 

A democratization of Ukraine would represent a chance to demonstrate to the Russian elite and society a relevant model for development for their own country.

‘Because of the close relations and multifarious contacts between Ukrainians and Russians, a successful Ukrainian re-democratization would leave a deeper impression in Russia than the various models, advices and demands that the West has presented to the Kremlin during the last 20 years. If the Ukrainians could demonstrate that a large eastern Slavic and Orthodox post-Soviet nation is able to build and sustain a real democracy - this would be of all-European importance. It would constitute a more weighty argument for a renewed democratization of the Russian Federation too than the many respective appeals of the EU and US, of the past. [...] A democratization of Ukraine would represent a chance to demonstrate to the Russian elite and society a relevant model for development for their own country. Should such a strategy be successful, this could also lay the foundation for a durable partnership and, perhaps, even for a values community between Russia and the EU in the 21 century.' - from Andreas Umland, 'Comment: Europe's path to Moscow leads through Kiev', EU Observer, 21 April 2011

A more extensive version of this article is forthcoming, in May 2011, in IP Global: The Journal of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), vol. 12, no. 2.

Andreas Umland is senior lecturer at Kyiv’s Mohyla Academy with the German Academic Exchange Service. He is administrator of the webarchive and biweekly bulletin “Russian Nationalism” at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/russian_nationalism/.

I will miss her serene mind, great spirit, infectious laugh, inspiring energy, and sound judgement

"Mourning the early death of Galina Kozhevnikova, one of the best Russians I have known. She was an extraordinary human being, and, as SOVA's site rightly says, 'a unique researcher of Russian nationalism and xenophobia.' I will miss her serene mind, great spirit, infectious laugh, inspiring energy, and sound judgement. She was taken when Russia needed her most. She was incredible - fearless and scared, passionate and cool, enjoying life and hard-working, joking and serious - all, at the same time. During the last years, she had become quite prominent in Russian and Western media, but remained totally unpretentious in personal communication. It is strange that a person like her is suddenly taken by something as trivial as a disease...."

See Andreas Umland's article on the late Galina Kozhevnikova (in Russian): Andreas Umland, 'Nationalism: Not To Be Left Without Attention. In place of an obituary for Galina Kozhevnikova (1974-2011)', Polit.ru, 9 March 2011

 

Today I want to focus mainly on the question of whether this charm offensive directed at the West has gone hand in hand with internal liberalisation. As so often, one can find confirmation of this argument but it is equally possible to claim that nothing has changed.

 

"[...] Over the past few months many Western observers have wallowed in a comforting belief that there is an escalating tension between the more liberal, western-oriented Medvedev and the more conservative, rather confrontational Putin, citing as evidence the very public dismissal of Moscow’s Mayor Luzhkov on the one hand, and Putin’s unfriendly comments about the Moscow rallies for the freedom of assembly on the other.

Whether this is true or not (and I am rather inclined to think it is not) is a subject I will tackle in one of my future blogs. Today I want to focus mainly on the question of whether this charm offensive directed at the West has gone hand in hand with internal liberalisation. As so often, one can find confirmation of this argument but it is equally possible to claim that nothing has changed. Below are just three out of many possible examples:

Argument for liberalisation: The freedom of assembly rally on 31 October was allowed to go ahead. Argument against: This was still part of the anti-Luzhkov campaign. Sobyanin, the new Moscow Mayor, has yet to prove that he is better than his predecessor.

Argument for liberalisation: Last Thursday Aleksander Ausan, a long-standing NGO activist, critic of the system and author of numerous studies that link the modern economy with liberal freedoms, was appointed to the Presidential “Committee for the Modernisation and Technological Development of the Russian Economy.” Medvedev himself chairs this committee, which was established in May 2009 and currently has 22 members, including several government ministers, key officials from the presidential administration, heads of large national corporations, selected business leaders and now also Ausan. Argument against: Ausan has sold his soul to the devil (even though he may not know it yet, for he has a reputation as a man of integrity) and will be used as a fig leaf.

Argument for liberalisation: Even state television is getting increasingly critical of the political course. The most recent example was TV journalist Leonid Parfenov’s acceptance speech for the Vladislav Listyev award, in which he accused Russian TV of churning out state PR instead of information. Argument against: Although the text of his acceptance speech is available on the State TV Channel 1 website, the speech itself has not been broadcast on television. However, criticism of Putin and Medvedev has for a long time been banned only on television, a fact that Parfyonov criticized. However, at the moment everyone can write and say almost anything on the Internet without any political consequences.

And here are a few more arguments against:

The brutal beating in November of the outspoken journalist Oleg Kashin of the daily Kommersant. Kashin’s sworn enemies include the pro-Kremlin youth organistion Nashi. Soon after the beating Putin made a point of meeting Vasily Yakemenko, the founder of Nashi, and currently chairman of the State Youth Committee. The pretext was irrelevant but the signal was widely understood: Yakemenko and Nashi enjoy Putin’s special protection.

Another example: There has been a lot of talk about the dawn of a new era of destalinization. Yet on 30 October, the (official!) day of remembrance of victims of political repression, only three (!) governors (the same ones as last year) considered it necessary to comment publicly, or at least to make a written statement, on the subject. On the one hand, the State Duma adopted a declaration last Friday condemning the murders of more than 20,000 Polish officers by the Soviet NKVD secret service and Medevedev is generally expected to hand over further archival materials when he visits Poland early next week. On the other hand Memorial has lost 32 (!) lawsuits against the state archives that are refusing to make Katyń files available.

A further example: One year ago the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky was murdered in a detention centre through deliberate refusal to provide him with medical assistance. The state prosecutors, who had kept him under conditions that made him mortally ill and then refused him medical treatment, have been promoted and more recently decorated. […]

And that is before I have said a single word about Chechnya and the North Caucasus. In Dagestan a war is raging between Islamist groups and a corrupt state. Chechnya is a slaughterhouse, where not even slaughtered cattle bleat. In Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria violence and assaults are commonplace. And the backlash in the rest of the country is putting all people from the Caucasus region increasingly under suspicion of terrorism. […]" - an extract from the Russia-blog by Jens Siegert on the Boell Foundation website, posted on 28 November 2010.

Jens Siegert lives in Moscow and is director of the Moscow office of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, a foundation closely linked to the German Green Party.